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ABSTRACT 
 Revenue allocation plans (RAPs) are one way in which Native American tribal 
governments distribute their casino profits equally to every member of the tribe. This study 
matches tribes with approved RAPs to their respective “treatment” counties. These treatment 
counties are then matched and compared to control counties of similar geography and population 
through difference-in-difference analysis. Through this analysis, it is apparent that there are no 
effects of RAPs on unemployment rates in treatment counties – however, there seems to be a slight 
positive effect on employment-to-population ratios and labor force participation rates. This paper 
finds that the RAP in 22 counties (by proxy, tribes) studied do not follow the income effect. 
Instead, the study suggests that windfall (or non-labor) income on these tribes has a positive, yet 
small, effect on labor supply. 
Keywords: income effect, labor supply, Native American economics, basic income, non-labor 
income  
INTRODUCTION 
Background: Gaming on Native American Reservations 
Casinos and gaming institutions have become widely popular on Native American 
reservations within the past thirty years. How did these reservations become hubs for gambling? 
Through a series of court cases and regulatory battles, reservations received the right to host 
gaming institutions on native land.  
Initially, Bryan v. Itasaca County (1976) revolved around a class action suit regarding a 
state’s ability to collect taxes on tribal land. The final ruling held, unanimously, that Public Law 
280, which reads that states can assume control over reservations, did not apply to civil matters 
but, rather, to only criminal matters. This landmark case gave tribes more autonomy over 
economic activity in their reservations, as the state retained criminal jurisdiction but could no 
longer dictate civil matters without Congressional consent. After this ruling, the question 
regarding whether gambling was a criminal or civil matter came to the forefront of the Native 
American gaming conversation. 
Bryan v. Itasaca County opened up new questions regarding Native American 
reservations’ autonomy, paving way for the historic California v. Cabazon Band of Mission 
Indians (1987) ruling. Therefore, the ruling lifted the restrictions states could place on Indian 
reservations regarding gaming and, thus, the Indian casino was born. A year later, President 
Reagan signed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, creating a regulatory framework, forming the 
National Indian Gaming Commission, and expanding gaming protections for Native American 
reservations country-wide (Akee, Spilde, and Taylor, 2015).  
Native American casinos particularly thrive due to the uniqueness of gaming legality 
compared to most of the U.S. While Nevada and Louisiana are the only two U.S. states to 
legalize commercial gambling statewide, Native American reservations generally have more 
lenience to open commercial gambling institutions to the public. The majority of states with 
Native American reservations allow for Indian gaming (Humphrey). State residents may then 
travel to reservations to gamble because “domestic” gaming is illegal, unavailable, or 
inconvenient (or far away). 
Therefore, there is no coincidence that the gaming industry rapidly grew in a number of 
reservations. In 1996, less than ten years later, Native American casinos made $4.5 billion from 
Class III gaming (and $300 million on additional goods in casinos) - $1.6 billion directly given 
back to tribes in the form of per capita payments (“National Gaming”). 
Literature Review 
Per capita payments through revenue allocation plans (RAPs) are a way of distributing 
casino profits to members of the respective tribe. In order for tribes to distribute per capita 
payments, they must submit a plan to and receive approval from the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA). These payments range in size and frequency – however, per capita payments are not 
conditioned based on labor supply of individuals. This way, the payment acts as a windfall, 
increasing the overall income of an individual without increasing wages. According to economic 
theory, this would result in an income effect, but not a substitution effect (Gamel, Balsan, and 
Vero, 2006). The income effect suggests that, once individuals receive per capita payments, they 
will reduce their labor supply because they can attain the same income as before (in time = -1) as 
they can now (in time = 0) with less work hours. However, this is not necessarily the case in 
practice – understanding and empirically testing the significance of this effect is a key aspect of 
this thesis. 
Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (2001) studied the effect of unearned income on labor 
earnings of lottery winners. The authors found in their study an MPE of 11% (the marginal 
propensity to reduce earnings per dollar of non-labor income), a significant but clearly not 
substantial decrease in earnings. This study builds on the income effect theory – although 
individuals do not considerably change their labor behavior, it is evident that a windfall, such as 
a lottery win, creates a reduction in labor supply.  
Similarly, Sila and Sousa (2014) support the notion that unearned income imposes a 
negative, albeit small, effect on an individual’s labor supply. In studying windfall gains from the 
European House Panel, the two find that the result is more people are more likely to drop out of 
the labor force entirely rather than reduce number of hours worked in favor of leisure. Although 
they found a slight positive effect in middle-aged adults seeking investment, most demographics 
as a whole reduced labor supply when receiving windfalls. There is a marginal fall in the utility 
of wealth, so overall future labor supply is also reduced. The study finds that windfalls 
particularly reduce labor when the windfalls are unanticipated – since these payments are part of 
tribal policy and approved by the BIA (“Tribal Revenue,” 2016), it is unlikely that the RAP per 
capita payments are unanticipated by their recipients. Therefore, this thesis, in congruence with 
the two aforementioned studies, expects there to be a small but notable reduction in labor supply 
on Native American tribes. 
 The income effect and windfalls discussion also has broader implications on the basic 
income debate. The designation of leisure as a normal or inferior good is essential in 
understanding individuals’ labor decisions. If leisure is normal, then increased income should 
result in increased consumption of leisure. If leisure is inferior, there should be reduced 
consumption of the good. Gamel, Basan, and Vero (2005) conducted a survey and found that 2/3 
of respondents do not view leisure as a normal good. This suggests that the majority of 
respondents, when receiving a windfall like those of RAPs in tribes, would actually decrease 
their leisure compared to work hours – a deviation from the properties of the income effect. The 
authors found some labor supply reduction, though – but this tended to be in those with less 
stable jobs or those leaving the labor force to pursue investment behavior, like attend college. 
There are also social factors such as non-income work benefits and preferences that can taper the 
reduction in labor supply. These social considerations are necessary to understand when 
implementing policy, but are not the focus of this thesis. The assignment of “inferior good” to 
leisure can have major implications on those receiving per capita payments and the presence (or 
lack thereof) is considered during the study. The fact that, from the results, employment-to-
population ratio has a generally positive trend with RAPs suggests that people may consider 
leisure to be an inferior good within the particular tribes studied. 
The unemployment rate reflects the number of people who have recently been out of 
work yet are actively seeking a job. However, this study is examining whether people reduce 
their labor supply or exit the labor force entirely due to windfalls via per capita payments. If 
people are receiving these payments, it’s unlikely that they will have a significant propensity to 
leave their current job and look for a new one – rather, it is more important to understand one’s 
propensity to willingly leave the workforce entirely due to windfall payments, without searching 
for a new job. The results show a very negligible effect on unemployment rates. 
Through a difference-in-difference analysis, this study analyzes the effect of RAPs on 
unemployment rates, employment-to-population ratios, and labor force participation rates on 22 
tribes by studying their respective counties by proxy. Although there is little effect on 
unemployment rates, there is an overall small positive effect on employment-to-population ratios 
and labor force participation rates. This could be attributed to the idea proposed by Gamel, 
Basan, and Vero (2005) – leisure is perceived as an inferior good and, thus, income effect may 
not be present when receiving windfalls. Although there is not enough conclusive evidence to 
consider this true, it is an interesting lens to use when looking at the results of this study. Though 
there may be some limitations to the analysis, particularly due to the lack of tribe-specific data 
and using counties as proxies, the results show an interesting result which deviates from 
traditional thinking regarding income effect and non-labor income. Future research, including a 
better understanding of the type and amount of per capita payments, may be necessary in 
understanding the effect of RAPs to the fullest extent. 
METHODOLOGY 
Treatment Group 
In this experiment, the treatment group consists of counties with large tribal populations. 
First, the dataset, which consisted of all tribes (578), was narrowed down 120 tribes that 
received approval of their respective revenue allocation plans from the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
to distribute per capita payments as of 2009. This list was provided by request by William A. 
Taggart and Thaddieus W. Conner from Indian Gaming and Tribal Revenue Allocation Plans: A 
Case of “Play to Pay,” data originally retrieved via request from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 
This also includes the dates in which the revenue allocation plan was approved, the first of which 
was 1993. All data are from datasets accessible online from the U.S. Census Bureau, the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.  
Matching Tribes to Counties 
 There is a lack of historical data regarding employment and labor supply on Native 
American tribes dating back to 1990. In order to completely find and analyze population data, it 
was imperative to match tribes to their respective counties. The tribes are matched to counties via 
the city in which the tribal seat of government is located, found from a dataset provided online 
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. For example, the Comanche Nation of Oklahoma’s seat of 
government is in Lawton, OK which is located within Comanche County borders. Therefore, the 
county included in the treatment group is Comanche County, OK.  
Choosing Tribes to Include 
 Rather than a statistical analysis using a random sample, this paper focuses on the 
analysis of employment data for 22 major tribes. First, the dataset was reduced from 120 to 109 
tribes – 11 RAP-approved tribes were not on the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ official tribal 
directory. The choice to analyze specific tribes, rather than to randomly sample, is due to the fact 
that some tribal populations are too small to be actually reflected on county employment data. 
Thus, this paper does not intend to find a trend that applies to all RAP programs, since the 
sample is not random. Rather, this paper will focus specifically on the RAP’s effect on 22 tribes, 
but will not attempt to extrapolate the findings to apply to all tribes. In order to truly understand 
the effect of RAPs on Native American employment, it is imperative that the effects of said 
programs can be interpreted from county data. Therefore, when narrowing the dataset to one that 
can translate into results in county-level analysis, the tribe had to fulfill two conditions. 
Condition 1 (treatment): The tribal population must exceed 1,000 members as of 2010. 
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 > 1000 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 2010 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟. 
Condition 2 (treatment): The tribal population must makeup at least 5% of the respective total 
county population. 
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
≥ 0.05 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 2010 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟. 
46 of 109 (42%) tribes fulfilled the first condition. Of the remaining 46 tribes, 25 (54%) had over 
5% of the county population living within the tribes as of 2010. Further, three tribes were 
excluded due to inconclusive or inaccessible data. Therefore, this study analyzes the employment 
behavior on 22 major tribes that were approved for per capita payments, consist of over 1000 
members, and represent at least 5% of their respective county’s population. For example, as of 
2010 census, Comanche Nation of Oklahoma has 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 = 23,330 (> 1000) and has 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 =124,098, so 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
= 0.1880 (> 0.05). Therefore, this tribes meets both conditions and its county 
is included in the treatment group in this paper.  
Control Group 
 A control group is used to control for outside macroeconomic, political, technological, or 
social factors that may influence the unemployment, employment, or labor force participation of 
the treatment group. Therefore, it is necessary to compare a treatment county’s changes in labor 
supply with a comparable control county that does not have a major tribe that fulfills 
aforementioned conditions 1 (treatment) and 2 (treatment). In this paper, each treatment county 
is matched with a unique control county. This study identifies control counties using three 
narrowing conditions. 
Condition 1 (control): The control county must share a border (land or water) with its matched 
treatment county. 
Condition 2 (control): The control county must not be a treatment county. 
Condition 3 (control): Within the pool of shared-border counties without major RAP-approved 
tribes, the control county must be the one closest in population to the treatment county’s 
population. 
Condition 4 (control): The control county must be unique. 
For example, Comanche County, OK is matched with Grady County, OK because the 
two counties share a border (condition 1 [control]), Grady County is not already a treatment 
county (condition 2 [control]), Grady County is the shared-border county that closest in 
population to Comanche County’s population (condition 3 [control]), and Grady County is not 
used as a control county for any other treatment county (condition 4 [control]). 
Independent Variable 
 The independent variable is the presence of a significant tribe (meets conditions 1 
[treatment] and 2 [treatment]) with an approved RAP. Therefore, the treatment group is the 
group of counties with the independent variable (the existence of a significant tribe with an 
approved RAP) while the control group is the group of counties that have an absence of this 
variable.  
Dependent Variables 
Unemployment 
 Unemployment rates per county through the years 1990-2010 are widely available 
through the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟  
𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 
Employment-to-Population Ratio 
 The employment-to-population ratio in this study is 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟
𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  
where 𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 15 − 64. 
 Employment-to-population ratio from 1990-2010 was not readily available. Therefore, 
this study used the number of employed persons from the aforementioned Bureau of Labor 
Statistics dataset divided by the estimated populations per county per year from the U.S. 1990 
and 2000 censuses, using the age range 15-64.  
Labor Force Participation Rate 
 The labor force participation rate used in this study is 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟
𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤 𝑝𝑝𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 
 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟. 
Like the employment-to-population ratio, the labor force participation rate was not 
readily available – therefore, it was extrapolated by dividing the number of employed plus the 
number of unemployed persons by the county population estimates for ages 15-64 from the 1990 
and 2000 censuses. 
Difference-in-Difference Analysis 
 This study’s findings will lie in the difference-in-difference analysis between the results 
of three dependent variables: unemployment rate, employment-to-population ratio, and labor 
force participation rate of treatment and control counties across time. In doing so, the dependent 
variable is isolated from other effects, such as macroeconomic or political changes, that may 
affect a given state. By using the difference-in-difference analysis approach (Lechner, 2011), the 
study is able to hold for confounding variables by comparing the treatment (or intervention) 
group, where the RAP was approved and, therefore, the “event” occurred, and the control group, 
where this event did not occur.  
The analysis relies on the parallel trends assumption – if the event, RAP approval, did not 
occur, then the difference between the treatment and control counties for any given variable 
would remain constant. Therefore, the larger the difference in difference (or spread), the larger 
the deviation from the “common trend” and, thus, the more significant the effect of the event. If 
the spread is negative, there is a negative effect of the event on the given dependent variable and, 
if positive, a positive effect. The difference-in-difference estimator isolates the effect from the 
RAP approval from time trends and individual characteristics. 
DID Estimator 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
Where  
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 (𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
− 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝, 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟) 
𝛽𝛽0 = 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 1) 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 2) 𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 
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 Before RAP approval After RAP approval Difference 
Treatment county 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3  
Control county 𝛽𝛽0 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1  
Difference 𝛽𝛽2 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝛽𝛽3 = 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 
Table 1. Difference-in-difference estimator rationale. 
The difference-in-difference (or spread), 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, is found for every dependent variable – 
unemployment, employment-to-population ratio, and labor force participation rate.  
Event “RAP approval” occurs at t=0. It is important to learn the difference-in-difference 
for various time frames to understand the short, mid, and long-term effects of the RAP approval. 
Thus, this study will examine the three-year spread 𝑆𝑆3 (the difference between the dependent 
variable at time t+1 and t-1), the five-year spread 𝑆𝑆5 (the difference between the dependent 
variable at time t+2 and t-2) and a seven-year spread 𝑆𝑆7 (the difference between the dependent 
variable at time t+3 and t-3). 
Analysis 
𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇 − 𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇 = 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 
Where, for any given year, 𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇 is the unemployment rate of the treatment county, 𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇 is the 
unemployment rate of the control county, and 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 is the unemployment rate difference. 
𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 − 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷 
Where, for any given year, 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 is the employment-to-population ratio of the treatment county, 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇 
is the employment-to-population ratio of the control county, and 𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷 is the employment-to-
population ratio difference. 
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 − 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 = 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷 
Where, for any given year, 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 is the labor force participation rate of the treatment county, 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 is 
the labor force participation rate of the control county, and 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷 is the labor force participation rate 
difference for any given year. 
𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 ,𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷 ,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷 are then be plotted on a graph at every given year (t-3 to t+3) to visually 
understand the effect of given event, RAP approval at time t=0 (see appendix). After the visual 
representation, a difference-in-difference will be taken for each individual reservation then as an 
average of all 22 reservations studied.  
Difference-in-Differences (or Spreads) 
There will be difference-in-difference estimates for a three-year spread (t-1 to t+1), five-
year spread (t-2 to t+2), and seven-year spread (t-3 to t+3) for the three dependent variables. This 
allows for a more thorough analysis and understanding of whether there are short-term or long-
term effects of the RAP approval across time or whether significant effects are absent entirely. 
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if 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 > 0, then there is a positive effect of the RAP on labor force participation. 
If 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 < 0, then there is a negative effect of the RAP on labor force participation. 
If 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 = 0, then there is no effect of RAP on labor force participation. 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Unemployment Rate 
 Figure 1. Unemployment rate difference (U_D) at time t=-3 to t=3 for all studied tribes with the average difference at each time 
period. 
 Tribe 𝑺𝑺𝑼𝑼,𝟑𝟑 𝑺𝑺𝑼𝑼,𝟓𝟓 𝑺𝑺𝑼𝑼,𝟕𝟕 
Comanche Nation, OK -0.6% 0.1% -0.2% 
Eastern Bank of Cherokee Indians, NC 1.4% 0.5% -2.3% 
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin -0.2% -0.5% 0.1% 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians 0.5% 0.3% 0.8% 
Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes, OK 0.1% -0.3% -0.5% 
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall 
Reservation, ID 0.1% 0.0% -0.2% 
Klamath Tribes, OR 0.1% -1.1% -1.2% 
Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde 
Community of Oregon -1.0% -1.3% -1.0% 
Stockbridge Munsee Community, Wisconsin -0.9% -0.6% -0.3% 
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon 0.2% -0.9% -0.9% 
Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan 1.6% 0.7% 2.8% 
Poarch Band of Creeks, AL -0.5% -2.7% -6.2% 
Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma 0.3% 1.2% 1.8% 
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe - Fond du Lac Band 0.3% 0.0% 1.9% 
Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians, Oklahoma 1.3% 0.4% -1.1% 
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe - Mille Lacs Band 0.9% 1.1% 0.7% 
Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa -0.3% -0.2% -1.3% 
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa 
Indians, MI -0.1% -1.0% 0.1% 
Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, 
MI 0.9% 1.3% 2.0% 
Coeur D'Alene Tribe, ID -2.3% -2.5% -1.5% 
St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin -0.4% -2.0% -0.6% 
Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin 0.2% -0.5% 1.5% 
Average 0.1% -0.4% -0.3% 
Table 2. Tribes with three-year, five-year, and seven-year spreads for unemployment rate 
differences. 
 The differences between the treatment and control county in the short-term (𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈,3), mid-
term (𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈,5), and long-term (𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈,7) are relatively insignificant. Although there are a few differences 
that seem to be quite significant in treatment and control counties for tribes like Poarch Band of 
Creeks (𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈,7 = −6.2%), where there seems to be a strongly negative relationship between the 
RAP and the unemployment rate, this is offset by numerous tribes with relatively high 
differences like Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan (𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈,7 = 2.8%), Minnesota 
Chippewa Tribe - Fond du Lac Band (𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈,7 = 1.9%), and Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa 
Indians, MI (𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈,7 = 2.0%). Overall, 13, or 59.1%, of 22 treatment counties had a negative long 
term effect on unemployment relative to their control county.  
It is unsurprising that the data reflects little significant effect of RAPs on unemployment 
rate. By the very definition of unemployment, it makes sense that per capita payments would not 
increase unemployment. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, unemployed individuals 
are those that have looked for work within the past four weeks and are available to work. It is 
unlikely that more (or less) people will be fired from or leaving their jobs in search of a new job.  
However, one example of the potential for per capita payments to provoke 
unemployment would be if, due to the new windfall payment, people are more willing to leave 
their current job in search of one that is more fulfilling to them but may not pay as much as their 
old job. Therefore, people have more flexibility to move between jobs to find meaningful work 
with less of a focus on salary or pay – additionally, it can act as unemployment insurance, giving 
people more freedom to leave their current jobs in search of a new one (Gamel et al. 2005) This 
would, theoretically, increase frictional unemployment. However, there is little evidence of that 
occurring in these 22 tribes as a whole, but perhaps this could be playing a role in tribes with 
positive unemployment change. 
Employment-to-Population Ratio 
 
 
 Figure 2. Employment-to-population ratio differences (E_D) at time t=-3 to t=3 for all studied tribes with the average difference at 
each time period.
 Tribe 𝑺𝑺𝑬𝑬,𝟑𝟑 𝑺𝑺𝑬𝑬,𝟓𝟓 𝑺𝑺𝑬𝑬,𝟕𝟕 
Comanche Nation, OK 0.89% -1.65% 5.44% 
Eastern Bank of Cherokee Indians, NC -2.68% -2.17% 5.61% 
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin 1.59% 8.12% 15.22% 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians -5.37% 7.63% 5.10% 
Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes, OK 3.76% 3.53% 0.98% 
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall 
Reservation, ID -1.32% -0.95% -1.47% 
Klamath Tribes, OR 1.52% 2.32% 2.93% 
Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde 
Community of Oregon 5.43% 6.15% 6.46% 
Stockbridge Munsee Community, Wisconsin 1.85% -6.88% -11.67% 
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon -2.30% -0.41% -1.59% 
Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan 5.25% 6.90% 8.23% 
Poarch Band of Creeks, AL 4.28% 8.04% 8.60% 
Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma 1.03% -1.22% -6.59% 
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe - Fond du Lac Band 0.81% 0.32% -3.33% 
Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians, Oklahoma 0.80% 5.08% 11.16% 
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe - Mille Lacs Band -5.41% 1.09% 3.30% 
Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa 0.96% 2.28% 6.23% 
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa 
Indians, MI 2.35% -0.26% -10.22% 
Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, 
MI 0.05% -1.80% 3.42% 
Coeur D'Alene Tribe, ID 6.20% 3.65% 2.49% 
St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin 5.76% 7.02% 0.61% 
Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin 1.26% 5.91% 4.19% 
Average 1.21% 2.40% 2.50% 
Table 3. Tribes with three-year, five-year, and seven-year spreads for employment-to-population 
ratio differences. 
 The differences observed the short-term (𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸,3), mid-term (𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸,5), and long-term (𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸,7) 
suggest a positive effect of RAPs on employment-to-population ratios in treatment counties and, 
thus, by proxy, tribes. The trend is generally positive and increases as time span increases from 
three to seven years. Although there are evident outliers, like Stockbridge Munsee Community, 
Wisconsin (𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸,7 = −11.67%) and Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, MI 
(𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸,7 = −10.22%), 16, or 72.7%, of the 22 treatment counties studied have had an increase in 
employment relative to their respective control county. There are also strongly positive outliers 
as well, including Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin (𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸,7 = 15.22%) and Otoe-Missouria 
Tribe of Indians, Oklahoma (𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸,7 = 11.16%), which could have skewed the data in a more 
positive direction. Although the long-term spread of (𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸,7 = 2.50%) reflects a slightly 
significant positive effect that RAP approval has had on employment in the 22 studied tribes as 
an aggregate, there is no significant underlying trend. 
Although the analysis on unemployment differences seemed to align with traditional 
economic theory, the observed employment differences do not fall into that same line. As 
mentioned in the literature review, the per capita payments would induce the labor effect, since 
total income would shift upward but marginal income per hour worked would remain unchanged. 
It is apparent that there is no significant effect of RAP on employment in any systematic way. 
However, the increase in employment-to-population ratios overall, and in the specific treatment 
counties of tribes like Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin (𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸,7 = 15.22%) and Otoe-
Missouria Tribe of Indians, Oklahoma (𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸,7 = 11.16%) could be due to the perception of leisure 
as an inferior good. Gamel et al.’s (2005) study found over half (2/3) of respondents thought of 
leisure to be an inferior good – when one has more income, one will demand more of said good 
and, when one has less income, they will spend more. Counties with significant positive effects 
of RAP on employment may also be empowered by the windfall. The extra income could be 
used to invest in self-employment, which could drive people to enter the workforce as a self-
employed individual and increase the employment-to-population ratio.  
In treatment counties where employment-to-population ratio saw a decline, like Fort Sill 
Apache Tribe of Oklahoma (𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸,7 = −6.59%), there could be a substantial income effect from 
the per capita payments as expanded upon by Imbens et al. (2001), as well as Sila and Sousa 
(2014).  
Budget Constraint and the Income Effect of Per Capita Payments 
An example of the income effect is presented below. Assume that an individual in Tribe 
A can work 160 hours a month for $10 per hour. Then, Tribe A’s RAP is approved by the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs and, from the profits of its tribal-run casino, distributes $200 per month 
to every adult in the tribe as a per capita payment. 
  
  
Figure 3. Example of income effect of per capita payments (due to RAP approval). 
With the $200 increase in income at every level of leisure, the indifference curve shifts 
from Id 1 to Id 2. The increase in leisure hours, from L1 to L2, reflects the income effect, where 
one can get the same (or, in this case, more) consumption than before the RAP approval while 
working less hours and, thus, consuming more leisure.  
Another reason why employment difference between the treatment and control counties 
could be due to investment in human capital. The extra income that per capita payments provide 
could provide incentive for individuals to invest in education or vocational training, as those would 
have more income to support themselves and invest in tuition and living expenses while in school 
(Gamel et al. 2005) leaving the workforce temporarily with plans to return. Although this may be 
contributing to decreases in employment-to-population ratio differences, this does not seem to be 
significantly apparent.  
Labor Force Participation Rate 
 
 Figure 4. Labor force participation rate differences (L_D) at time t=-3 to t=3 for all studied tribes with the average difference at each 
time period. 
 Tribe 𝑺𝑺𝑳𝑳,𝟑𝟑 𝑺𝑺𝑳𝑳,𝟓𝟓 𝑺𝑺𝑳𝑳,𝟕𝟕 
Comanche Nation, OK 0.56% -1.39% 5.55% 
Eastern Bank of Cherokee Indians, NC -1.63% -1.38% 4.98% 
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin 1.50% 8.63% 18.10% 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians -5.43% 7.90% 5.94% 
Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes, OK 4.07% 3.48% 0.72% 
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall 
Reservation, ID -1.35% -1.01% -1.74% 
Klamath Tribes, OR 1.74% 1.94% 2.40% 
Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde 
Community of Oregon 4.80% 5.45% 6.04% 
Stockbridge Munsee Community, Wisconsin 1.15% -7.61% -12.41% 
Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon -2.35% -1.21% -2.41% 
Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan 6.70% 7.86% 10.55% 
Poarch Band of Creeks, AL 4.22% 7.01% 5.57% 
Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma 1.23% -0.61% -5.67% 
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe - Fond du Lac Band 1.17% 0.26% -2.24% 
Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians, Oklahoma 1.84% 5.56% 10.73% 
Minnesota Chippewa Tribe - Mille Lacs Band -5.02% 2.03% 4.11% 
Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa 0.72% 2.26% 5.42% 
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa 
Indians, MI 2.50% -0.98% -10.35% 
Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, 
MI -0.25% -2.48% 3.23% 
Coeur D'Alene Tribe, ID 5.26% 2.15% 1.58% 
St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin 5.80% 5.78% 0.13% 
Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin 1.53% 5.70% 5.68% 
Average 1.31% 2.24% 2.54% 
Table 4. Tribes with three-year, five-year, and seven-year spreads labor force participation rate 
differences. 
 In terms of labor force participation, there is an overall aggregate average increasing 
trend in treatment counties relative to the control counties. Labor force participation and 
employment are very closely related, so it makes sense for the trends to be similar in nature. In 
fact, from earlier we found there was a negligible effect of RAPs on unemployment. Therefore, 
although some of the difference between labor force and employment trends could be due to 
small changes in unemployment, due to the insignificant effects of RAPs on unemployment, 
employment-to-population ratio spreads and labor force participation spreads are extremely 
similar and closely interlinked in the short, mid, and long-terms. 
CONCLUSION 
Limitations and Other Considerations 
Sampling 
 One primary limitation faced throughout the study is the fact that there was not enough 
data to execute a statistical analysis with a random sample. Due to the nature of matching, where 
tribes are matched to their respective counties, it was necessary for the tribe to be large enough 
so that the effects of the RAPs were visible at the county level. In order to do this, the study used 
conditions 1 and 2 (treatment) to create a data set that would be more visibly represented at the 
county level. However, because of this (and other inaccessible data issues), many of the tribes 
(98/120 or 81.7%) of the tribes could not be analyzed through the matching method and, thus, 
the study could not use a random sample. Due to this fact, the study focused primarily on the 
employment behavior and labor supply within the applicable 22 tribes to find a common pattern. 
However, this study does not attempt to extrapolate that pattern as one that can apply to all tribes 
with RAPs – rather, it is an examination, at face-value, of the studied 22 tribes. 
Matching Tribes to Counties 
 As with many economic studies, it is very unlikely to control for all possible confounding 
variables. Due to the lack of tribal specific data, it was imperative to match tribes to their 
respective counties in order to study the effects of RAP approval on different dependent 
variables. This way, the treatment (matched) county could be paired to a respective control 
county (following conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4 (control)), similar in population and geography, to 
control for political, social, economic, and technological factors affecting the U.S. or the specific 
state. In matching treatment to control counties with similar populations and geography, this 
paper attempts to match the treatment county with a control county with a similar trajectory. This 
matching process controls for all state and nation-wide macro changes, but events within the 
specific counties are difficult to control for. The control county does not perfectly control for 
external factors. There could be other factors such as intra-county political or economic changes 
as well as tribe-specific events that could have made a significant impact during the time period 
studied.  
 The presence of a confounding variable in either the treatment or control county would be 
in violation of the parallel trends assumption. 
Population Estimates 
 Another limitation of the study is the use of population estimates, rather than actual 
numbers. The data from the U.S. Census Bureau, total county populations and working age 
populations, are based on estimates from the 1990 and 2000 censuses. Although census estimates 
are certainly not perfect, the estimates have vastly improved in accuracy. According to a working 
paper by Tammany J. Mulder and the census staff (2002), census estimates have become far 
more accurate through improved knowledge on and stabilization of population trends and, thus, 
the proximity of estimates to actual numbers is closer than ever. Although this study could be 
more accurate with actual, rather than estimated, population numbers, it is unlikely that the 
results would be significantly different. 
Looking Forward 
 There are many important future steps that should be taken in order to understand the 
effect of RAPs on a more holistic and concrete level. First, it is important to gain more data on 
tribes and reservations – using counties by proxy can be of use, but using actual tribal data would 
make the study more concrete.  
Beyond further data retrieval, there are a few interesting further approaches that could 
expand on the understanding of RAP effects on labor supply. If tribal specific data could be 
obtained, it would be very interesting to prepare a difference-in-difference analysis between 
tribes with casinos and RAPs and tribes with casinos, but without RAPs. Additionally, another 
area of research could be learning more about whether the size, not just the presence, of per 
capita payments changes the effect the RAP may have on labor supply. Lastly, it would also be 
very interesting to pursue qualitative and/or case study research with specific tribes that have 
enacted per capita payments. It is very important to learn from those who are actually within the 
tribe and interact with these payments – this is a necessary step for this topic’s future research. 
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APPENDIX 
Unemployment Rates Data 
 
Figure 5. Comanche Nation, OK Ud. 
Time Comanche 
Nation, OK 
-3 0.0% 
-2 -0.5% 
-1 -0.2% 
0 0.0% 
1 -0.8% 
2 -0.1% 
3 -0.2% 
Table 5. Comanche Nation, OK Ud. 
 
Figure 6. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, NC Ud. 
  
 Time Eastern Bank of Cherokee 
Indians, NC 
-3 0.6% 
-2 0.5% 
-1 -0.7% 
0 0.0% 
1 0.7% 
2 1.0% 
3 -1.7% 
Table 6. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, NC Ud. 
 
Figure 7. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin Ud. 
Time Menominee Indian Tribe of 
Wisconsin 
-3 2.4% 
-2 3.2% 
-1 2.6% 
0 2.0% 
1 2.4% 
2 2.7% 
3 2.5% 
Table 7. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin Ud. 
 
 
Figure 8. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians Ud. 
Time Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians 
-3 -2.2% 
-2 -1.4% 
-1 -1.9% 
0 -1.4% 
1 -1.4% 
2 -1.1% 
3 -1.4% 
Table 8. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians Ud. 
 
Figure 9. Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes, OK Ud. 
  
 Time Cheyenne and Arapaho 
Tribes, OK 
-3 0.4% 
-2 0.1% 
-1 -0.2% 
0 -0.3% 
1 -0.1% 
2 -0.2% 
3 -0.1% 
Table 9. Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes, OK Ud. 
 
Figure 10. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation, ID Ud. 
Time Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the 
Fort Hall Reservation, ID 
-3 0.6% 
-2 0.6% 
-1 0.7% 
0 0.6% 
1 0.8% 
2 0.6% 
3 0.4% 
Table 10. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation, ID Ud. 
 
Figure 11. Klamath Tribes, OR Ud. 
Time Klamath 
Tribes 
-3 0.1% 
-2 -0.5% 
-1 -0.8% 
0 -0.8% 
1 -0.7% 
2 -1.6% 
3 -1.1% 
Table 11. Klamath Tribes, OR Ud. 
 
Figure 12. Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon Ud. 
  
 Time Confederated Tribes of the Grand 
Ronde Community of Oregon 
-3 2.0% 
-2 2.5% 
-1 2.0% 
0 2.2% 
1 1.0% 
2 1.2% 
3 1.0% 
Table 12. Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon Ud. 
 
Figure 13. Stockbridge Munsee Community, Wisconsin Ud. 
Time Stockbridge Munsee 
Community, Wisconsin 
-3 -1.0% 
-2 -0.9% 
-1 0.0% 
0 -0.5% 
1 -0.9% 
2 -1.5% 
3 -1.3% 
Table 13. Stockbridge Munsee Community, Wisconsin Ud. 
 
Figure 14. Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon Ud. 
Time Confederated Tribes of Siletz 
Indians of Oregon 
-3 1.9% 
-2 2.5% 
-1 1.2% 
0 1.0% 
1 1.4% 
2 1.6% 
3 1.0% 
Table 14. Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon Ud. 
 
Figure 15. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan Ud. 
  
 Time Saginaw Chippewa Indian 
Tribe of Michigan 
-3 -6.5% 
-2 -5.2% 
-1 -4.3% 
0 -4.5% 
1 -2.7% 
2 -4.5% 
3 -3.7% 
Table 15. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan Ud. 
 
Figure 16. Poarch Band of Creek Indians, AL Ud. 
Time Poarch Band of 
Creeks 
-3 0.2% 
-2 0.1% 
-1 -0.6% 
0 -1.0% 
1 -1.1% 
2 -2.6% 
3 -6.0% 
Table 16. Poarch Band of Creeks, AL Ud. 
 
Figure 17. Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma Ud. 
Time Fort Sill Apache Tribe of 
Oklahoma 
-3 0.6% 
-2 1.2% 
-1 1.4% 
0 1.3% 
1 1.7% 
2 2.4% 
3 2.4% 
Table 17. Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma Ud. 
 
Figure 18. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe - Fond du Lac Band Ud. 
  
 Time Minnesota Chippewa Tribe - 
Fond du Lac Band 
-3 -3.3% 
-2 -1.6% 
-1 -1.4% 
0 0.0% 
1 -1.1% 
2 -1.6% 
3 -1.4% 
Table 18. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe - Fond du Lac Band Ud. 
 
Figure 19. Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians, Oklahoma Ud. 
Time Otoe-Missouria Tribe of 
Indians, Oklahoma 
-3 0.0% 
-2 -1.0% 
-1 -2.4% 
0 -1.9% 
1 -1.1% 
2 -0.6% 
3 -1.1% 
Table 19. Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians, Oklahoma Ud. 
 
Figure 20. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe - Mille Lacs Band Ud. 
Time Minnesota Chippewa Tribe - 
Mille Lacs Band 
-3 0.7% 
-2 0.1% 
-1 -0.2% 
0 0.0% 
1 0.7% 
2 1.2% 
3 1.4% 
Table 20. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe - Mille Lacs Band Ud. 
 
Figure 21. Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa Ud. 
  
 Time Sac & Fox Tribe of the 
Mississippi in Iowa 
-3 1.0% 
-2 -0.3% 
-1 -0.2% 
0 -0.2% 
1 -0.5% 
2 -0.5% 
3 -0.3% 
Table 21. Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa Ud. 
 
Figure 22. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, MI Ud. 
Time Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & 
Chippewa Indians, MI 
-3 -2.7% 
-2 -1.6% 
-1 -2.8% 
0 -2.3% 
1 -2.9% 
2 -2.6% 
3 -2.6% 
Table 22. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, MI Ud. 
 
Figure 23. Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, MI Ud. 
Time Little Traverse Bay Bands of 
Odawa Indians, MI 
-3 -3.1% 
-2 -2.7% 
-1 -3.4% 
0 -3.3% 
1 -2.5% 
2 -1.4% 
3 -1.1% 
Table 23. Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, MI Ud. 
 
Figure 24. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, ID Ud. 
  
 Time Coeur D'Alene 
Tribe, ID 
-3 0.7% 
-2 1.0% 
-1 1.2% 
0 -1.9% 
1 -1.1% 
2 -1.5% 
3 -0.8% 
Table 24. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, ID Ud. 
 
Figure 25. St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin Ud. 
Time St. Croix Chippewa Indians 
of Wisconsin 
-3 -0.8% 
-2 -0.1% 
-1 -0.8% 
0 -0.6% 
1 -1.2% 
2 -2.1% 
3 -1.4% 
Table 25. St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin Ud. 
 
Figure 26. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin Ud. 
Time Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake 
Superior Chippewa Indians of 
Wisconsin 
-3 -1.6% 
-2 -1.2% 
-1 -0.9% 
0 -1.1% 
1 -0.7% 
2 -1.7% 
3 -0.1% 
Table 26. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin Ud. 
 
Figure 27. Average Ud. 
  
 Time Average 
-3 -0.5% 
-2 -0.2% 
-1 -0.5% 
0 -0.6% 
1 -0.5% 
2 -0.6% 
3 -0.7% 
Table 27. Average Ud. 
Employment-to-Population Ratios Data 
 
 
Figure 28. Comanche Nation, OK Ed. 
Time Comanche 
Nation, 
OK 
-3 -15.7% 
-2 -10.7% 
-1 -13.7% 
0 -13.4% 
1 -12.8% 
2 -12.4% 
3 -10.3% 
Table 28. Comanche Nation, OK Ed. 
 
Figure 29. Eastern Bank of Cherokee Indians, NC Ed. 
Time Eastern 
Bank of 
Cherokee 
Indians, 
NC 
-3 -33.5% 
-2 -30.9% 
-1 -29.8% 
0 -30.2% 
1 -32.4% 
2 -33.1% 
3 -27.9% 
Table 29. Eastern Bank of Cherokee Indians, NC Ed. 
 
Figure 30. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin Ed. 
  
 Time Menominee 
Indian 
Tribe of 
Wisconsin 
-3 -11.6% 
-2 -8.8% 
-1 -4.8% 
0 -2.3% 
1 -3.2% 
2 -0.7% 
3 3.6% 
Table 30. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin Ed. 
 
Figure 31. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians Ed. 
Time Mississippi 
Band of 
Choctaw 
Indians 
-3 9.8% 
-2 7.3% 
-1 19.3% 
0 21.2% 
1 13.9% 
2 14.9% 
3 14.9% 
Table 31. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians Ed. 
 
Figure 32. Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes, OK Ed. 
Time Cheyenne 
and 
Arapaho 
Tribes, 
OK 
-3 3.7% 
-2 1.3% 
-1 1.8% 
0 2.2% 
1 5.6% 
2 4.8% 
3 4.6% 
Table 32. Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes, OK Ed. 
 
Figure 33. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation, ID Ed. 
  
 Time Shoshone-
Bannock 
Tribes of 
the Fort 
Hall 
Reservation, 
ID 
-3 -0.5% 
-2 -0.2% 
-1 -1.2% 
0 -0.1% 
1 -2.6% 
2 -1.1% 
3 -2.0% 
Table 33. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation, ID Ed. 
 
Figure 34. Klamath Tribes, OR Ed. 
Time Klamath 
Tribes 
-3 -0.8% 
-2 1.0% 
-1 1.2% 
0 1.5% 
1 2.7% 
2 3.3% 
3 2.1% 
Table 34. Klamath Tribes, OR Ed. 
 
Figure 35. Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon Ed. 
Time Confederated 
Tribes of the 
Grand 
Ronde 
Community 
of Oregon 
-3 1.7% 
-2 1.2% 
-1 3.1% 
0 6.7% 
1 8.5% 
2 7.3% 
3 8.2% 
Table 35. Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon Ed. 
 
Figure 36. Stockbridge Munsee Community, Wisconsin Ed. 
  
 Time Stockbridge 
Munsee 
Community, 
Wisconsin 
-3 14.4% 
-2 11.1% 
-1 1.9% 
0 3.0% 
1 3.8% 
2 4.2% 
3 2.7% 
Table 36. Stockbridge Munsee Community, Wisconsin Ed. 
 
Figure 37. Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon Ed. 
Time Confederated 
Tribes of 
Siletz Indians 
of Oregon 
-3 -0.9% 
-2 -2.7% 
-1 -1.6% 
0 -1.8% 
1 -3.9% 
2 -3.1% 
3 -2.5% 
Table 37. Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Oregon Ed. 
 
Figure 38. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan Ed. 
Time Saginaw 
Chippewa 
Indian 
Tribe of 
Michigan 
-3 2.2% 
-2 0.5% 
-1 -0.1% 
0 2.9% 
1 5.2% 
2 7.4% 
3 10.4% 
Table 38. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan Ed. 
 
Figure 39. Poarch Band of Creeks Ed. 
  
 Time Poarch 
Band 
of 
Creeks 
-3 -3.8% 
-2 -7.0% 
-1 -5.7% 
0 -3.5% 
1 -1.4% 
2 1.0% 
3 4.8% 
Table 39. Poarch Band of Creeks Ed. 
 
Figure 40. Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma Ed. 
Time Fort Sill 
Apache 
Tribe of 
Oklahoma 
-3 -5.9% 
-2 -11.5% 
-1 -10.5% 
0 -9.7% 
1 -9.5% 
2 -12.8% 
3 -12.5% 
Table 40. Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma Ed. 
 
Figure 41. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe - Fond du Lac Band Ed. 
Time Minnesota 
Chippewa 
Tribe - 
Fond du 
Lac Band 
-3 6.4% 
-2 1.9% 
-1 -0.5% 
0 1.7% 
1 0.3% 
2 2.2% 
3 3.1% 
Table 41. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe - Fond du Lac Band Ed. 
 
Figure 42. Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians, Oklahoma Ed. 
  
 Time Otoe-
Missouria 
Tribe of 
Indians, 
Oklahoma 
-3 0.9% 
-2 0.2% 
-1 0.5% 
0 0.1% 
1 1.3% 
2 5.3% 
3 12.0% 
Table 42. Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians, Oklahoma Ed. 
 
Figure 43. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe - Mille Lacs Band Ed. 
Time Minnesota 
Chippewa 
Tribe - 
Mille Lacs 
Band 
-3 -11.3% 
-2 -8.2% 
-1 0.3% 
0 -2.7% 
1 -5.2% 
2 -7.1% 
3 -8.0% 
Table 43. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe - Mille Lacs Band Ed. 
 
Figure 44. Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa Ed. 
Time Sac & Fox 
Tribe of 
the 
Mississippi 
in Iowa 
-3 -6.6% 
-2 0.3% 
-1 2.9% 
0 4.3% 
1 3.9% 
2 2.6% 
3 -0.4% 
Table 44. Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa Ed. 
 
Figure 45. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, MI Ed. 
  
 Time Grand 
Traverse 
Band of 
Ottawa & 
Chippewa 
Indians, 
MI 
-3 16.7% 
-2 6.3% 
-1 4.8% 
0 4.5% 
1 7.1% 
2 6.1% 
3 6.5% 
Table 45. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, MI Ed. 
 
Figure 46. Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, MI Ed. 
Time Little 
Traverse 
Bay 
Bands of 
Odawa 
Indians, 
MI 
-3 -24.4% 
-2 -19.0% 
-1 -19.0% 
0 -18.7% 
1 -19.0% 
2 -20.8% 
3 -21.0% 
Table 46. Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, MI Ed. 
 
Figure 47. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, ID Ed. 
Time Coeur 
D'Alene 
Tribe, 
ID 
-3 -0.8% 
-2 -0.6% 
-1 -1.4% 
0 4.4% 
1 4.8% 
2 3.0% 
3 1.6% 
Table 47. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, ID Ed. 
 
Figure 48. St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin Ed. 
  
 Time St. Croix 
Chippewa 
Indians of 
Wisconsin 
-3 -1.7% 
-2 -4.6% 
-1 -3.6% 
0 -4.5% 
1 2.1% 
2 2.4% 
3 -1.1% 
Table 48. St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin Ed. 
 
Figure 49. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin Ed. 
Time Lac du 
Flambeau 
Band of 
Lake 
Superior 
Chippewa 
Indians of 
Wisconsin 
-3 1.0% 
-2 -0.9% 
-1 1.4% 
0 3.0% 
1 2.6% 
2 5.0% 
3 5.2% 
Table 49. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin Ed. 
 
Figure 50. Average Ed. 
Time Average 
-3 -2.8% 
-2 -3.4% 
-1 -2.5% 
0 -1.4% 
1 -1.3% 
2 -1.0% 
3 -0.3% 
Table 50. Average Ed. 
